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The horror genre is typified by two types of emotion it attempts 
to elicit in audiences: fear and disgust (e.g., see Carroll, 1990; 
Gaut, 1993; Hanich, 2010). Horror is thus well placed to repre-
sent and discuss social and psychological themes associated 
with such emotions. Beyond the surface-level threat posed by 
many horror antagonists—the sharp knife of the serial killer, 
the gnashing fangs of the werewolf—horror often concerns 
itself with the fears, anxieties, and traumas, real or perceived, 
that assail ordinary human existence. Grief is a key theme that 
falls under this rubric. This is reflected in some of the most 
high-profile horror films of the past 15 years, including The 
Descent (Marshall, 2005), The Orphanage (Bayona, 2007), 
Lake Mungo (Anderson, 2008), The Babadook (Kent, 2014), It 
Follows (Mitchell, 2014), The Ritual (Bruckner, 2017), and 
Hereditary (Aster, 2018), to name but a few. This recurrent 
contact between horror and grief has been recognized in popu-
lar film criticism (e.g., Covitz, 2019; Sheil, 2016; Srihari, 
2018). At the same time, popular film criticism has tended to 
focus on dissecting the emotional authenticity of particular 
films. Meanwhile, philosophers and cognitive scientists study-
ing horror have focused on the broad contours of the genre’s 
appeal. This article goes some way to bridging the gap between 
these two tendencies, exploring the ways in which horror, as a 
genre, is especially effective at representing the experience of 
grief. In doing so, we offer a picture that helps unify the many 
disparate observations of how individual horror films effec-
tively capture and communicate grief. While our focus will be 
squarely on film, much of what we say applies to other media.
We present and defend two overlapping claims. The first, 
weaker claim is that horror is exceptionally well placed to rep-
resent grief, given narrative features that are deeply embedded 
within the genre. More specifically, we argue that the use of 
antagonistic forces in horror—what we broadly refer to as 
“monsters”—is effective at representing the disruption to one’s 
core, taken-for-granted beliefs or “assumptive world” that is 
characteristic of grief. This claim concerns the representative 
capacities of the horror genre, given its typical tropes and struc-
tures. Building on this, the second, stronger claim is that horror 
can offer psychological benefits for the bereaved. This concerns 
the cognitive/emotional effects on specific demographics con-
suming horror. Together, these claims suggest the relationship 
between horror and grief extends beyond the mere fact that grief 
is unpleasant, and horror is suited to exploring unpleasant 
things—analogous to the relationship between, say, adolescence 
and horror (e.g., De Palma, Carrie, 1976), sexual violence and 
horror (e.g., Scott, Alien, 1979), or racism and horror (e.g., 
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Peele, Get Out, 2017). Rather, the special relationship between 
grief and horror lies in the latter’s ability to intimately capture 
and communicate the phenomenology of grief and, in doing so, 
help the bereaved make sense of their experience.
The article is structured as follows. First, we outline what 
grief is, concentrating on its narrative dimensions. Along the 
way, we distinguish between two narrative approaches to grief: 
the narrative structure approach to grief—where grief itself is 
understood as possessing a kind of narrative structure—and the 
narrative-as-a-tool approach—where narratives are understood 
as a device for restoring coherence to one’s disrupted world as a 
result of bereavement. Next, in “Representing Grief Through 
Horror” we demonstrate how the role of monsters in horror is 
effective at representing the emotional experience of grief, 
using The Babadook (Kent, 2014) as a case study. Finally, “The 
Psychological Benefits of Horror” defends the idea that horror 
can offer psychological benefits to the bereaved by functioning 
as a means of narrative “containment” and emotional regulation 
for grief.
The Narrative Dimensions of Grief
Despite how commonplace bereavement is, the nature of grief is 
hard to pin down. This is in part because grief appears to mani-
fest quite differently among subjects, and even within the same 
subject over time. Unlike many other emotional experiences, 
grief generally unfolds over many months or years, and there 
may be large temporal gaps during which grief is not actively 
experienced. It also seems to encompass numerous different 
types of emotional experience. Because of this, it is widely 
accepted that grief is a kind of temporally extended process 
(e.g., Goldie, 2011; Klass et al., 1996; Ratcliffe, 2017) that 
evolves over time, rather than a single emotional state.1 Some 
philosophers have further argued that narratives play an espe-
cially important role in this process. However, there are two dis-
tinct types of approach that emphasize the role of narratives. 
The first is the narrative structure approach to grief, according 
to which grief itself is characterized by a particular kind of nar-
rative structure (e.g., Goldie, 2011). The second is what we will 
call the narrative-as-a-tool approach, according to which we use 
narratives to help restore coherence to a changed and disrupted 
world (endorsed by researchers such as Higgins, 2013, 2020; 
Ratcliffe, 2017).
The narrative structure approach tells us that what individu-
ates the grief process from other such processes is its structure. 
Peter Goldie (2011, see also 2002) provides a notable version of 
this approach, taking grief’s narrative structure to be what uni-
fies the temporally extended processes of grieving. For Goldie, 
our lives have an overarching narrative structure, allowing us to 
recount episodes from our lives in a meaningful way. Within 
this overarching structure, individual episodes like emotional 
experiences also each have a unified narrative structure:
[W]ith emotional experience, it is the notion of narrative structure which 
ties together and makes sense of the individual elements of emotional 
experience—thought, feeling, bodily change, expression, and so forth—
as parts of a structured episode; and in turn it underpins the way that 
individual emotional episodes relate to the emotion of which the episode 
is a part, and this emotion to mood, to character trait and to character, 
and to the person’s life seen as a whole. (2002, pp. 4–5)
With regard to grief, the narratives that unfold thus explain how 
the process all “hangs together” as a meaningful and unified 
emotional experience (Goldie, 2011). Grief is taken to unfold in 
the form of a particular sort of pattern, which is said to be 
explanatorily prior to what is occurring at any given moment. 
Goldie thinks that grief’s pattern is typified by a psychological 
correlate of a literary approach known as “free indirect style,” 
which blends together multiple perspectives and, in particular, 
“exploits the ironic gap” between the internal perspective of a 
character and the external perspective of the narrator or author 
(2011, p. 129). When one grieves, their memories of their loved 
one are likewise colored by their knowledge that this person is 
now dead: “In grief, you might well remember the last time you 
saw the person you loved, not knowing, as you do now, that it 
was to be the last time. And this knowledge will infect the way 
you remember it” (2011, p. 131).
Thus, one’s experience involves an intertwining of perspec-
tives. Importantly, for Goldie, narratives of this form are inextri-
cable from the grief process.
Goldie’s narrative structure view thus makes a strong claim 
about the nature of the grief process, which has opened the 
approach to criticism. Ratcliffe (2017) has argued that the kind 
of narrative structure described by Goldie is not necessary for 
the grieving process. As Ratcliffe points out, grief comes in 
many different forms, making it hard to see what the character-
istic narrative shape of grief could be. Moreover, Ratcliffe 
argues, grief may often be characterized by a lack of narrative 
coherence. He notes that grief is frequently described as involv-
ing disruption, discontinuity, and lack of coherence, particularly 
in cases of complicated grief (2017, p. 160).2 Westlund agrees 
that “there is indeed an important sense in which the loss of a 
loved one is narratively intractable: it resists integration into a 
teleologically structured narrative arc with a beginning, a mid-
dle, and an end” (2018, p. 29).3 Other researchers have likewise 
emphasized the disruptive and confusing nature of grief—an 
idea that we shall draw upon throughout this article. For exam-
ple, Parkes (1988) argues that grief involves major alterations to 
one’s “assumptive world”—one’s taken-for-granted system of 
beliefs. The bereaved must revise their system of deeply held 
assumptions about the world. Attig (2011) relatedly argues that 
grief is a process of relearning one’s world. Revising all of one’s 
taken-for-granted beliefs about the world, and learning to live in 
a new reality, is likely to be a painstaking and slow process. 
Focusing on the profound disruption characteristic of grief 
seems to support the idea that grief is not (by necessity) charac-
terized by a coherent narrative structure.
There is, however, a weaker claim that can be made about the 
role of narratives in grief. Various researchers have argued that 
narratives can be used to help the bereaved cope and restore 
coherence amid grief (e.g., Higgins, 2013, 2020; Ratcliffe, 
2017). Such an approach does not require an account of grief’s 
necessary conditions, or of how grief is unified and individuated 
from other processes. Instead, it emphasizes that narrative is a 
tool that is frequently employed throughout the grieving  process. 
As Ratcliffe notes, “(some) people plausibly resort to narrative 
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in a distinctive way because things do not make sense. It is part 
of an attempt—willful or otherwise—to restore coherence” 
(2017, p. 160). Likewise, Higgins argues that “[T]hose who 
grieve make use of stories, which seem to assist the efforts to 
reorganize their lives, and this suggests that narrative structure, 
with its temporally unfurled character, is valuable to processing 
grief” (2013, p. 172). Psychologist Neimeyer (2005) relatedly 
tells us that narrative practices can aid grievers in a process of 
“meaning making,” helping them to make sense of what has 
happened. Narratives can be used as a tool to restore coherence 
to a world that has been irrevocably changed.
Elsewhere, Higgins (2020) further argues that aesthetic prac-
tices, of which narrative practices are a subset, are ubiquitous in 
grief and that they can allow for its “containment.” She provides 
a comprehensive discussion of the different senses in which 
grief might be “contained” by such practices: they allow emo-
tions to be focused and expressed in a controlled way; they can 
help restore confidence in the world; they can serve as a means 
of connecting and communicating with both the living and the 
dead; and they can aid in attaining a sense of closure. They can 
help to restore coherence to our experiences as well as allowing 
for social connection. Of particular relevance for our purposes, 
she makes a suggestion about the role of the “ghost” figure, as 
presented in works of fiction and other media:
My suggestion is that mainstream ideas about ghosts’ characteristics and 
behavior reflect common features of bereavement and the confused 
thinking about the deceased that is often involved . . . [T]he ghost’s 
nebulousness is itself reflective of one’s unstable condition in 
bereavement, in which one fluctuates between feeling that the deceased 
is present and that he or she is absent, or present by virtue of the palpable 
absence. The ghost figure builds in this simultaneous sense of presence 
and absence along with other confusing notions that complicate the 
bereaved person’s sense of the person who has died—the person’s 
independence of efforts to hold on, the lack of location, the privileged 
epistemic vantage, and possible emotional estrangement. (Higgins, 
2020, p. 15)
The claim that people often use narratives to cope with grief is 
more plausible than the claim that grief itself, by necessity, has 
a narrative structure. As we shall see, viewing horror films pro-
vides one type of narrative practice that may aid in the restora-
tion of coherence and in the communication of the experience of 
grief to others. In what follows, we will explore further how 
horror tropes can both aid in accurately reflecting the phenom-
enology of grief and serve as a “vessel” for the containment and 
the communication of grief, to use Higgins’s terminology. In 
doing so, we explore the psychology of watching horror films, 
considering the question of why the experience of horror should 
ever be positive and beneficial. We begin by looking at why hor-
ror is especially well placed to represent the experience of grief.
Representing Grief Through Horror
Monstrous Disruption and Disruptive Monsters
The horror genre is principally characterized by the purposeful 
elicitation of fear, disgust, and related emotions in its audience 
(e.g., Carroll, 1990; Gaut, 1993; Hanich, 2010). In turn, horror 
is thematically preoccupied with the targets of terror, trauma, 
anxiety, and the like. The representation and communication of 
such themes often gravitate around the antagonist of the story, 
that is, the monster. “Monster” is intended here in its broadest 
sense, referring to any antagonistic entity in the horror genre 
whose destructive power endangers human well-being or social 
order, typified by a grotesque physical body or psychological 
character (e.g., gross tentacles or lack of moral conscience). 
Monsters may be supernatural (e.g., ghosts and vampires) or 
mundane (e.g., serial killers and predatory animals).4
Monsters are the primary cause of fear and disgust in horror, 
both to the characters and the audience, insofar their appearance 
and behavior cause the characters and audience to feel scared 
and disgusted. However, we can distinguish between the pri-
mary fear and disgust caused by the monster’s appearance or 
behavior and the fear and disgust related to the film’s themes, 
though these usually overlap in ways that reinforce each other. 
Take the example of Alien (Scott, 1979). The Xenomorph poses 
an existential threat to the characters, communicated to them 
and the audience through its powerful and unnerving physiol-
ogy; the full force of the Xenomorph’s terrifying design lies in 
its embodying the recognizable properties of a dangerous preda-
tor while simultaneously displaying nonterrestrial properties, 
both in its surface-level appearance and its abnormal ontog-
eny—the “bizarreness of its metamorphic pathway” (Cruz, 
2012, p. 164). By exploiting this design, the film elicits the fear 
of being hunted by a deadly but exotic animal. At the same time, 
Alien evokes the more ordinary fear surrounding sexual vio-
lence (e.g., Hurley, 1995). This is mostly achieved through vis-
ual association and allegory, for example, characters are 
impregnated with an egg via the throat, without consent, and 
forced to give birth at the expense of their own bodies. Specific 
physical features of the monster further signal this theme, with 
the use of penetrating inner mouths, phallic tails, and oozing 
bodily fluids. Thus, as Alien demonstrates, horror uses the char-
acteristics of monsters to reinforce themes concerning more 
familiar targets of fear or disgust.
Human fears are multitudinous and there is practically no 
end to the sorts of terrors, traumas, and anxieties that horror 
takes aim at, from motherhood (e.g., Polanski, Rosemary’s 
Baby, 1968) to consumerism (e.g., Romero, Dawn of the Dead, 
1978) to xenophobia (e.g., Hong-jin, The Wailing, 2016). One 
especially prevalent theme, however, is grief. As mentioned 
before, there have been many horror films about grief, including 
some of the most popular and critically acclaimed horror films 
of all time: Don’t Look Now (Roeg, 1973), The Changeling 
(Medak, 1980), Pet Sematary (Lambert, 1989), The Descent 
(Marshall, 2005), Lake Mungo (Anderson, 2008), Antichrist 
(Von Trier, 2009), It Follows (Mitchell, 2014), The Invitation 
(Kusama, 2015), The Orphanage (Bayona, 2007), The Ritual 
(Bruckner, 2018), The Babadook (Kent, 2014), Hereditary 
(Aster, 2018), and Midsommar (Aster, 2019).
More than simply another entry in the list of fears that horror 
concerns itself with, we contend that the tropes of horror are 
especially well suited to representing grief.5 To appreciate this, 
we must recall the previous claim about the way in which grief 
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is characterized, in part, by a disruption to one’s assumptive 
world (Parkes, 1988). As it happens, disruption to assumptive 
worlds is a core feature of horror narratives. Our central claim 
here is that the horror films under discussion use an unexpected 
monster as an effective way to represent the experience of grief; 
there is a parallel between the disruptive experience of grief for 
the bereaved and the disruptive effect of a monster’s entry into 
the protagonist’s life.6 In arguing that horror can enable an 
enhanced appreciation of the phenomenology of grief by virtue 
of features of the genre, we make no claim that all horror films 
that involve a bereavement in the plot will succeed in doing so; 
some such films may use a protagonist’s bereavement merely as 
a plot device and involve a rather shallow representation of 
grief. Nor do we claim that a horror film’s ability to represent 
the phenomenology of grief dictates whether the film is aes-
thetically successful; for example, a film that offers a shallow 
representation of grief may nonetheless be a good horror film. 
Finally, as a larger issue we cannot do justice to here, we leave 
aside the precise relationship between authorial motivation and 
audience response in determining aesthetic success; however, 
given our claim about the power of horror films to communicate 
the phenomenology of grief, our focus is on interpretation rather 
than intent.
Horror films about grief, we suggest, often follow a common 
template. A typical structure involves some or all of the follow-
ing stages:
1. The protagonist loses a loved one during the opening 
stages of Act 1 or prior to the events of the film. This 
establishes the protagonist’s daily lived experience, 
which has been disrupted by the death of their loved 
one, demonstrated through the protagonist’s emotional 
vulnerability as they struggle to cope with day-to-day 
tasks.
2. The monster appears (this arrival is often caused by, or 
is part of, the inciting incident). This radically disrupts 
the protagonist’s understanding of reality and mirrors 
the disruption to the protagonist’s assumptive world 
caused by bereavement.
3. The protagonist defeats, evades, or tames the monster 
and, in turn, restores some balance to their emotional 
life.
Well-known horror films about grief which follow all or most of 
this pattern include Don’t Look Now (Roeg, 1973), Changeling, 
(Medak, 1980), The Descent (Marshall, 2005), Lake Mungo 
(Anderson, 2008), The Babadook (Kent, 2014), Hereditary 
(Aster, 2018), Midsommar (Aster, 2019), and many more. Let’s 
examine this structure further.
“The Narrative Dimensions of Grief” detailed the ways in 
which grief involves emotional upheaval and, in turn, disruption 
to one’s assumptive world. Stage 1 thus reflects fundamental 
emotional contours of grief and is expected in any film where 
grief is a central theme. Take the example of Don’t Look Now 
(Roeg, 1973) in which protagonist John Baxter (Donald 
Sutherland) loses his daughter Christine (Sharon Williams) in 
the opening scene, after she drowns. In his article on horror and 
grief, screenwriter and director Steven Sheil (2016) observes 
this opening scene thusly,
The most indelible image from the film, and one of the most truly 
horrific in cinema, comes early on, as Donald Sutherland rears up from 
the pond where his young daughter has just drowned. His face is a pure, 
agonized mask of grief and pain as he clutches onto her lifeless body. It’s 
a moment that is all about crossing the threshold, being thrust suddenly 
and violently into a new world: the endless landscape of grief.
While perhaps not always portrayed with the same unflinching 
asperity as in horror films, Stage 1 is present in most nonhorror 
films about grief too, across different genres, including diverse 
works such as Three Colors: Blue (Kieślowski, 1993), Secret 
Sunshine (Lee, 2007), Manchester by the Sea (Lonergan, 2016), 
and My Life as a Courgette (Barras, 2016). However, as Sheil 
observes, the portrayal of Baxter’s response at the death of his 
daughter is notably depicted as “horrific,” and sincerely repre-
senting the characteristic horror of this initial stage of grief, we 
suggest, is typically reserved for horror films.
Most horror film plots feature the appearance of a monster of 
some kind. In this way, almost all horror films feature some-
thing analogous to Stage 2. What is unique to horror films about 
grief is the way the monster’s arrival mirrors and extends the 
preexisting disruption to the protagonist’s life through the death 
of a loved one. In general, horror monsters do not conform to 
the protagonist’s established worldview because this abnormal-
ity—the monster’s being out of place or appearing to be out of 
place—is essential to its power to cause fear, disgust, and related 
emotions. This abnormality is underlined by the monster’s 
arrival from outside the expected metaphysical or social order. 
Recall that, as Parkes (1988) highlights, grief is partly charac-
terized by the shattering of one’s assumptive world, reflecting 
Sheil’s characterization of the grieving Baxter in Don’t Look 
Now (Roeg, 1973) as he is “thrust suddenly and violently into a 
new world.” Monsters also shatter assumptions about the world, 
often suddenly and violently. The disruptive power of confron-
tation with the abnormal is not exclusive to horror; fantasy and 
science fiction sometimes highlight the unsettling effect on a 
protagonist who is thrust from the ordinary world into an abnor-
mal one—their lives upended by contact with the extraordinary. 
However, it is noteworthy that many examples of this also fea-
ture grief as a key theme (and sometimes overlap with the horror 
genre), for instance, The NeverEnding Story (Peterson, 1984), 
Labyrinth (Henson, 1986), Pan’s Labyrinth (del Toro, 2006), A 
Monster Calls (Bayona, 2016), and Annihilation (Garland, 
2018).
The disruptive effect of monsters or related aspects of the 
abnormal—in horror or other genres—contrasts with instances 
of unusual creatures that superficially resemble monsters but 
are in some sense expected within the fictional world. For 
example, Sauron in The Lord of the Rings trilogy (Jackson, 
2001, 2002, 2003) is an existential threat to the peoples and 
social order of Middle Earth. To this extent, Sauron is a “mon-
strous” figure. However, Sauron is not out of place; he does not 
fall outside of the conceptual framework of our central  characters 
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who accept, without resistance, his existence. Thus, Sauron is 
not intended specially to scare or disgust the audience. By con-
trast, the horror monster scares and disgusts the protagonist, and 
the audience by extension, partly by being unforeseen. This dis-
ruptive power within the narrative is harnessed by horror films 
to effectively represent grief. We believe it is no accident that 
horror films about grief typically feature monsters that are 
supernatural or otherwise especially anomalous. This is likely, 
in part, because such outlandish monsters are well suited for 
representing the disruptive nature of bereavement. In a phrase: 
the more unexpected, the more disruptive. Moreover, as Higgins 
highlights in her discussion of the ghost archetype (see discus-
sion in “The Narrative Dimensions of Grief”), specific monster 
tropes seem apt to represent particular facets of this disruption.
Horror films often close with the protagonist overcoming the 
monster. By establishing the intimate connection between the 
protagonist’s grief and the presence of the monster in their life, 
horror films about grief institute a narrative association between 
the resolution of the protagonist’s emotional need and the reso-
lution of the protagonist’s struggle with the monster. Put other-
wise, resolution of the secondary conflict (roughly, restoring 
some acceptable level of emotional stability following bereave-
ment) is narratively tethered to resolution of the central conflict 
(roughly, overcoming the monster). Stage 3 is thus a typical fea-
ture of horror films about grief. Indeed, it is not only the out-
come of the conflicts which are paralleled but the means by 
which they are resolved; the manner in which the monster is 
overcome is symbolic of how the protagonist adapts to their 
loss. Defeating, evading, or taming the monster requires the 
protagonist to accept its existence—which is often denied for 
much of the story—and confront the monster, mirroring the pro-
tagonist’s need to accept the reality of their loss and to learn to 
live in an irrevocably altered world.
The Babadook (Kent, 2014) effectively illustrates these 
stages:
1. The story follows Amelia, who grieves the death of her 
husband Oskar who died in a car accident as he drove 
her to the hospital to give birth. Amelia is struggling to 
bring up their son Samuel as an only parent. Amelia is 
further exhausted by Samuel’s constant nightmares 
which keep her awake.
2. Before bed one evening, Amelia reads Samuel a pop-up 
storybook titled “Mister Babadook” that he has found in 
his bedroom. The book is about a creature who terror-
izes those who learn of his existence. A series of escalat-
ing events then take place. Amelia initially explains 
away these events as caused by Samuel (who blames the 
Babadook), but eventually Amelia sees the creature for 
herself. Events culminate when Amelia is possessed by 
the Babadook and tries to kill Samuel. Amelia attempts 
to strangle Samuel but stops after he gently strokes her 
cheek, causing her to reject the Babadook and regain 
control.
3. Amelia confronts the creature and traps him in the base-
ment. Later, Amelia and Samuel are shown to have a 
more loving, stable relationship. Amelia visits the 
Babadook in the basement. The monster lashes out at 
her but backs off after Amelia placates it. Amelia returns 
to her garden to celebrate her son’s birthday.
Besides meeting the three stages outlined before, it is worth 
noting a couple of other ways in which The Babadook connects 
the film’s events and characteristics of the monster with 
Amelia’s grief. Attention to these details helps illustrate how 
individual films build upon a generic structure by using devices 
suited to their plots (akin to Alien’s use of the Xenomorph’s 
characteristics to enhance the theme of sexual violence). First, 
early on, Amelia attempts to destroy the pop-up book but soon 
discovers it on her doorstep mysteriously reconstructed. The 
book now contains new pages informing Amelia the creature 
will become stronger if its existence is denied. One interpreta-
tion of this plot point, we suggest, is that it represents the notion 
that attempting to deny or suppress one’s grief is not sustaina-
ble.7 Instead, as with the Babadook, one must eventually 
acknowledge, process, and adapt to one’s loss (which Amelia 
does). Secondly, it is notable that Amelia never destroys the 
Babadook but instead captures it. The Babadook has not left 
Amelia; the creature is now a permanent fixture of her life. 
However, now she is in control. This mirrors the recognition 
that the bereavement will always be a part of Amelia’s life. She 
learns to negotiate the loss as part of her new, ordinary life 
experience. Like the Babadook, the disruptive power of a 
bereavement is tamed.8 Steve Covitz (2019) offers a similar 
observation:
This is precisely how grief operates: turning away and leaving it 
unaddressed only tightens its grip. Much like the Babadook, it always 
stays with you and lurks in the corners of your thoughts, waiting for 
when you’re most vulnerable to its torture. All this attention to the 
subtlety of Amelia’s emotional life serves to augment the use of the 
monster as a metaphor for grief’s disruptive power.
One might also draw a connection between Amelia’s taming of 
the Babadook and various influential (although not uncontro-
versial) frameworks for understanding grief. That Amelia must 
return to the basement daily to feed the Babadook is reminiscent 
of Stroebe and Schut’s (1999) “dual process” approach to cop-
ing with bereavement. According to this model, people come to 
terms with loss through an oscillation between focus on the loss 
(reflected by the Babadook itself) and upon restoration of one’s 
life within an altered world (Amelia’s ability to live her life 
once more). As time goes on, this model tells us that the focus 
of the bereaved turns increasingly to restoration rather than loss. 
That the Babadook remains indefinitely is also suggestive of 
certain ideas from the literature on “continuing bonds” with the 
dead. As part of this approach, continuing bonds theorists have 
argued against the notion that there is really an ultimate end-
point to grief and that people can or should fully “get over” a 
bereavement (e.g., see Rosenblatt, 1996). The continued exist-
ence of the Babadook in Amelia’s life can be seen as a metaphor 
for such an understanding of grief.9
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Does Fear Feel Like Grief?
As we have seen, the horror genre is especially well placed to 
represent the seismic shifts in people’s worlds following a 
bereavement. One further question is whether the fear central to 
horror also captures an important facet of grief’s phenomenol-
ogy. Following his wife’s death, C. S. Lewis wrote:
No one ever told me that grief felt so like fear. I am not afraid, but the 
sensation is like being afraid. The same fluttering in the stomach, the 
same restlessness, the yawning. I keep on swallowing . . . And grief still 
feels like fear. Perhaps more strictly, like suspense. Or like waiting; just 
hanging about waiting for something to happen. It gives life a 
permanently provisional feeling. It doesn’t seem worth starting anything. 
I can’t settle down. I yawn, I fidget, I smoke too much. (1961, pp. 3, 33)
We might wonder whether grief and fear are alike in some way, 
and if so, whether the fear of both the protagonists and viewers 
of the horror film plays a role in the representation of grief.10 
Perhaps the fear generated by horror films could even, in some 
sense, “simulate” aspects of grief in the viewer, enhancing the 
film’s capacity to communicate grief’s phenomenology.
There are important differences between paradigmatic cases 
of emotions like fear and paradigmatic cases of grief. While fear 
can seemingly occur as a singular mental event or episode 
directed towards something frightening, as noted before, grief 
involves a complex process that unfolds over much more pro-
tracted periods of time. Nevertheless, there are two important 
ways in which the types of fear induced by horror may be phe-
nomenologically connected to grief: first, fear is sometimes one 
component of the emotional process of grief, and second, fear 
and grief involve certain similar physiological responses.
With regard to the first of these possible connections 
between grief and fear, since grief is a complex process involv-
ing many different emotions, plausibly fear is (or can be) one of 
the emotions encompassed by the grief process. In fact, Parkes 
et al. (2015, p. 5) state that among the expressions of grief, 
“Crying, fear [emphasis added] and anger are so common as to 
be virtually ubiquitous and most cultures provide social sanc-
tion for the expression of these emotions in the funeral rites and 
customs of mourning which follow bereavement.” Someone 
who has suffered a bereavement may be afraid of how their life 
will unfold without their loved one, and whether they will be 
able to cope. They may be afraid of losing other loved ones, or 
experience fear regarding their own mortality as part of their 
grief. Empirical work vindicates the claim that fear is often part 
of the grief process. For example, Barr and Cacciatore (2008) 
find a significant relationship between maternal grief and the 
fear of death. They break the fear of death down into several 
subtypes (fear of the unknown, fear of premature death, and 
fear of conscious death), all of which they find to be correlated 
with maternal grief. Likewise, in a study of widows whose hus-
bands died suddenly, Conant (1996) tells us that, “There was a 
desperation, fear, and sense of personal threat in the grief fol-
lowing these deaths—an immanence of the threat to the wid-
ow’s own mortality” (pp. 181–182). Bereaved children have 
been shown to often be fearful about the safety of remaining 
family members (e.g., Silverman & Worden, 1992), and 
Rosenblatt (1996) tells us that fear is among the reactions to 
loss that most commonly form a part of grief, which he takes to 
be an amalgamation of different emotional and cognitive reac-
tions (p. 45). Such research suggests that fear in various guises 
is a frequent aspect of the grief process.11 If this is correct, by 
generating fear in audiences, horror may then enable viewers to 
relate better to this particular facet of grief; by generating one 
of the common emotional components of grief, horror films 
help audiences in recognizing, and indeed somewhat experi-
encing, an aspect of grief.
A second way in which the fear invoked by horror may 
relate to the experience in grief is through giving rise to certain 
similar physiological reactions, regardless of whether fear is 
part of the grief process.12 In the first systematic study of grief, 
Lindemann (1944) highlighted a very wide array of physiolog-
ical features common among the bereaved. He found that acute 
grief was associated with many types of “somatic distress,” 
including features such as respiratory disturbance, weakness, 
and “a feeling of tightness in the throat” (p. 141). Importantly, 
some such physiological features of grief are similar to those 
found in fear. Research has shown that acute grief is associated 
with stress responses, much like fear, rendering it unsurprising 
that there are certain similar physiological effects involved. For 
example, grief is associated with elevated heart rate and blood 
pressure, and an increase in the stress hormone cortisol (for 
review, see Buckley et al., 2012), all three of which are also 
associated with fear (e.g., Hayashi et al., 2009; Lerner et al., 
2007). It has further been shown that such physiological 
changes are apparent in subjects’ responses to fear-inducing 
films (Kreibig et al., 2007). The relationship between emotions 
and their physiological features is complex and controversial, 
and many different emotions involve an overlap in such fea-
tures. Nevertheless, this does point towards another sense in 
which fear may capture certain facets of the experience of 
grief. This plausibly aids in horror’s capacity to represent grief 
by enabling the viewer to experience some of the physiological 
reactions involved in the grief process.
This section presented the claim that horror films are espe-
cially effective at representing and discussing grief. This is prin-
cipally because of a structural feature that is deeply embedded 
into the horror genre. Horror films often involve a monster 
whose arrival into the protagonist’s life causes a serious disrup-
tion to their ordinary worldview. Monsters force the protagonist 
to realize that their fundamental understanding of what the 
world is like, is mistaken. This resembles the common feature 
of grief, outlined in the previous section, whereby the world of 
the bereaved has been disrupted. More strongly, we suggest 
there is a kind of “cognitive mirroring” between what the pro-
tagonist is made to feel by the monster’s arrival and how the 
bereaved are made to feel during grief. This may be bolstered by 
horror’s ability to give rise to experiences of fear that bear some 
phenomenological relation to aspects of the grieving process. In 
the next section, we will push this idea further, suggesting that 
the representative powers of horror films may sometimes offer 
psychological benefits for the bereaved.
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The Psychological Benefits of Horror
Fear as a Rewarding Emotion
The previous section established that horror is well placed to 
represent grief. We now want to make the stronger claim that 
horror can provide a sort of containment for one’s grief and, 
thus, offer a beneficial effect. Something to this effect has been 
gestured at in a recent string of popular articles on horror films 
about grief. For example, writing for The New Yorker, Eren 
Orbey comments on the role of horror in helping him cope with 
the murder of his father as a child. Commenting on the relatabil-
ity of characters struggling with fear, he writes, “In my own 
experience, horror movies provided not an example for actions 
but an outlet for empathy, a chance to see characters contend 
with a kind of fear that my own peers could not fathom” (2016).
Before turning to the potential psychological benefits of hor-
ror for the bereaved, we will lay some groundwork by establish-
ing a general account of why consuming horror can be an 
appealing and rewarding experience. By addressing the appeal 
of horror in general, we set the foundations for the narrower 
claim that it offers benefits for those who are grieving.
Recent decades have seen considerable philosophical and 
empirical investigation into the appeal of the horror genre. 
These investigations often begin with the “paradox of horror.” 
The paradox revolves around the observation that, on the face of 
it, we shouldn’t enjoy horror because it elicits emotions that are 
taken to be unpleasant. At the same time, many of us do enjoy 
horror. More formally: 
1. Horror produces emotions such as fear and disgust.
2. Fear and disgust are unenjoyable emotions.
3. Audiences enjoy horror.
On the face of it, statements 1–3 are all true, yet these claims 
appear to be in tension with one another. There have been many 
different responses to the paradox, and we believe a complete 
answer will combine multiple factors, that is, we favor a pluralist 
account. For instance, some people may enjoy horror despite the 
unpleasant fear and disgust it causes, and the reasons why they 
enjoy one horror film may differ from the reasons why they 
enjoy another. At the same time, we concur with many theorists 
that fear and disgust are often central to horror’s appeal. While, 
again, the nature of this appeal is not necessarily one-dimen-
sional, the key claim for our purposes is that horror provides a 
kind of “safe space” in which to encounter fears and, thus, offers 
a rewarding experience. The idea that fear and disgust can be 
desirable or rewarding, given the context in which those emo-
tions are encountered, finds support in much of the philosophical 
literature (e.g., Gaut, 1993; Smuts, 2009). One of the most devel-
oped versions of this idea comes from Bantinaki (2012), who 
argues the fear generated by horror need not possess an overall 
negative valence, even if it involves some unpleasant physiolog-
ical symptoms and negative evaluative content.13 In other words, 
statement 2 is false, and so the apparent paradox dissolves.
Bantinaki’s (2012) solution to the paradox of horror is “inte-
grationist,” meaning it locates the attraction to horror in the 
emotional experience it elicits. Bantinaki further classifies her 
view as a “moderate hedonic view,” insofar as it acknowledges 
that consuming horror is enjoyable. Such enjoyment is defined 
in terms of a “welcoming stance” the subject has toward their 
emotion, given the overall experience: “The overall hedonic 
character of an emotion, that is, is attitudinal; it signals a wel-
coming or disapproving stance toward what one is undergoing” 
(2012, p. 388). Though fear and other emotions that are usually 
construed as “negative” characteristically involve unpleasant 
physiological symptoms, such responses may accompany states 
with different valences depending on the mode in which we 
welcome or resist the experience in question. In short, fear can 
be part of a desirable or pleasant experience when that experi-
ence offers some net reward. As Bantinaki summarizes,
[I]t is not the hedonic quality of bodily symptoms that determines an 
emotion’s valence. Increased heart acceleration followed by constrained 
breathing, for instance, are signs of arousal, but they are bodily responses 
that, as noted above, can occur in both negative and positive emotions, 
for example, at the sight of a snake and the sight of a loved one. Even 
symptoms that are commonly acknowledged as pains—for example, 
queasiness—can occur in euphoric conditions, as, for instance, when 
one is having an orgasm. (p. 387)
We agree with Bantinaki that the paradox of horror loses its 
mystery when we recognize how fear and disgust do not imply 
an unpleasant experience even if they are accompanied by 
unpleasant physiological components. If horror is potentially 
beneficial and rewarding, then the emotions it elicits can be 
experienced positively.
Of course, it remains to be shown what rewards horror 
offers, and the conditions under which it offers them. Again, 
Bantinaki provides a plausible answer: horror gives us the 
opportunity to experience fear within a controlled environment 
(see also Morreall, 1985; Smuts, 2009). As we understand it, 
horror allows us to confront and explore fear in an environment 
with limited and predictable parameters, which one may will-
ingly withdraw from either partially (e.g., closing one’s eyes) 
or wholly (i.e., switching off the film or leaving the cinema). 
She writes,
Through our encounter with horror fiction we are given a chance to 
confront or learn to cope with fear in a safe environment: we learn to 
control our fear feelings and display mastery over our reactions to 
frightening stimuli; to direct our thoughts—often aided by the 
narrative—to aspects of the situation that counter the fear (for instance, 
to the weak traits of the “monster” or to the resources that a protagonist 
has to confront it); or when the challenge is overwhelming, to manage it 
by seeking comfort in peers. (Bantinaki, 2012, p. 390)
The notion that control is vital for reaping horror’s rewards is 
reflected in much of the popular writing on horror films and 
grief too. For example, in a conversation between Eren Orbey 
and Steven Marans (Director of the Childhood Violent Trauma 
Center at Yale University), Marans hypotheses that horror 
appeals to those with trauma precisely because of the control it 
offers them:
You can turn away. You can turn down the volume. You can experience 
the level of arousal, the somatic sense of fear, and know in the back of 
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your mind that it’s not forever. We are sometimes drawn compulsively 
to the very things that scare us—as a method of mastering them. 
(Orbey, 2016)
It is worth noting that this account predicts that loss of control 
correlates with an overall negative experience when consuming 
horror. When one no longer possesses sufficient command over 
the parameters of the experience—perhaps one’s physiological 
reactions become too potent, say, when one’s heart beats too fast 
or one’s palms become too sweaty—one’s control is overridden, 
and the fear or disgust involved will convert to an overall nega-
tive experience.
The highly conditional nature of one’s experience of fear and 
disgust conforms to the finding from the empirical literature that 
preferences for consuming horror vary greatly between indi-
viduals (e.g., Hoffner & Levine, 2005; Martin, 2019). Relevant 
factors appear to include empathic sensitivity, sensation-seek-
ing, age, and gender. This supports the everyday observation 
that some people find horror very rewarding while others find it 
wholly disagreeable. However, preferences need not be binary, 
for example, one may enjoy some subgenres of horror and not 
others, and to a greater or lesser extent. We stress this because 
we believe whether one finds horror films about grief poten-
tially beneficial depends on one’s more general preference for 
the genre. Moreover, this research overlaps with the account 
just offered insofar as it helps uncover factors relevant to feel-
ings of control. For example, lower empathy along certain 
dimensions may help to ensure one’s physiological reactions are 
not overpowering (Martin, 2019). If one is too empathetic, for 
instance, one may lose the control required for a rewarding 
experience.
How Horror “Contains” and Regulates Grief
Thus far, we have established the general idea that horror can 
give rise to a positive or rewarding experience. Developing this, 
we will now offer a more targeted theory which suggests horror 
is capable of offering a psychological benefit for the bereaved.14 
As discussed above, a number of researchers have emphasized 
how narrative and aesthetic practices may help the bereaved to 
better understand and cope with their loss (e.g., Higgins, 2013, 
2020; Neimeyer, 2005; Ratcliffe, 2017). Kathleen Higgins 
argues that aesthetic practices allow for the “containment” of 
grief, in that they “facilitate restoration of coherence to our 
experience, as well as reconnection with the social world and 
recovery from the breakdown that profound loss involves” 
(2020, p. 9). Horror films are well placed to facilitate this kind 
of “containment” in a number of ways, and this may help with 
the process of making sense of one’s changed world following a 
bereavement. We further argue that horror films can, through 
their narrative structures, play a role in the regulation of one’s 
emotions that is beneficial to the bereaved.
First, due to horror films accurately representing a number of 
important features of grief, particularly with regard to the dis-
ruption to one’s world (as argued in the previous section), horror 
can help one to make sense of an experience that is otherwise 
incomprehensible. As Ratcliffe (2017) and Higgins (2020) note, 
narrative and aesthetic practices may aid in the process of com-
prehension that is integral to grief. In the case of horror, the 
films often accurately reflect important aspects of the phenom-
enology of grief and, in doing so, provide expression for a nebu-
lous experience that is difficult to grasp. Grief often involves a 
sense of isolation and detachment, and watching a film that con-
veys the horror of grief may help one to feel less alone and to 
communicate the experience of bereavement to others. The 
monsters of horror give a tangible (albeit symbolic) face to a 
sense of unreality and disruption. As Higgins notes of the ghost 
archetype, plausibly the ghosts’ “characteristics and behavior 
reflect common features of bereavement and the confused 
thinking about the deceased that is often involved” (2020, p. 
15). She takes their scary and alien qualities to reflect, for exam-
ple, the sense that we no longer know deceased loved ones in 
their new form, and their nebulousness to reflect how “one fluc-
tuates between feeling that the deceased is present and that he or 
she is absent, or present by virtue of the palpable absence” 
(2020, p. 15). Elsewhere, researchers have highlighted that var-
ious other monsters, such as zombies and vampires, likewise 
appear to occupy a liminal space between life and death (Davis 
& Crane, 2015), and so similar remarks may apply to these hor-
ror archetypes.
Another way in which horror films can enable communica-
tion and allow bereaved people to feel less alone is simply by 
virtue of their willingness to explore the topic of death. People 
often ignore death until its reality is forced upon them through 
an experience of bereavement, and they may discover others 
find it hard to discuss this with them. In horror films, the reality 
of death is confronted head on, which may serve to make the 
bereaved feel less alone, aiding a sense of connection with the 
social world. As Davis and Crane (2015, p. 427) argue, “Horror 
stories offer a narrative arena in which to develop a dialogic 
relationship with death and to fathom what mortality means as 
beings living to die”; in this way, the horror genre is representa-
tive of our “struggle to reconcile life and death.” Horror’s will-
ingness to tackle this topic provides another way in which it can 
aid in the “containment” of grief.
Plausibly, horror films do not only benefit the bereaved in 
facilitating connections with the social world. They can also 
shape one’s own emotional experiences in important ways. A 
number of researchers have argued that the surrounding world 
and aesthetic practices can serve to “scaffold” our affective 
experiences, playing a role in the regulation of our emotions 
(Colombetti & Krueger, 2015; Krueger, 2014). Practices such 
as listening to music, for example, can help to shape the ways 
our affective experiences unfold over time. Colombetti and 
Krueger tell us that music is able to “vent or give voice to emo-
tions” and thus we “delegate” certain regulatory tasks to it 
(2015, p. 1162). Horror films, we argue, are well placed to scaf-
fold a bereaved subject’s emotions: they can “give voice” to 
experiences characteristic of grief due to their ability to repre-
sent the experience (as suggested by our discussion in 
“Representing Grief Through Horror”), and play a regulatory 
role. In particular, they seem to be effective in providing a 
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 temporary narrative structure to one’s emotional experience. 
While grief may often be characterized as involving a lack of 
narrative coherence, films provide a narrative structure, and 
this may help to shape our emotional experience.
One way to develop this approach is provided by Velleman 
(2003), who argues that the ups and downs of narratives are felt 
through patterns of arousal and resolution. He suggests that a 
horror story might be understood emotionally in terms of initial 
puzzlement that gives way to horror, which finally gives way to 
relief (2003, p. 13). These “emotional cadences” are, for 
Velleman, not just random emotions pieced together, but rather 
ones that follow distinctive and familiar trajectories. In this 
way, horror films can help to shape one’s emotions into such a 
trajectory. Due to similarities between fear and aspects of 
grief’s phenomenology (highlighted in  “Does Fear Feel Like 
Grief?”), the emotional cadences induced through horror are 
congruent with (but less disrupted and chaotic than) certain 
emotional experiences characteristic of grief, thus helping to 
provide a kind of coherence to them. As we noted in the previ-
ous section, the way that emotions unfold through the con-
sumption of horror also occurs in a “safe” environment, 
allowing for a sense of control that is likely lacking while 
grieving. It does not seem to be necessary that grief is narrata-
ble in the way suggested by Goldie (2011), but it does seem 
that the emotional experience of grief can be regulated and 
structured through the use of narratives.
We can also use narrative and aesthetic practices in an 
attempt to trigger emotional effects while experiencing an 
absence of affective responses. Roberts (2019) tells us that 
emotional numbness consists in a “systematic mismatch 
between the presence of things that ought to be affectively 
significant for me, and the absence of my emotional response 
to those things” (p. 192). According to Roberts, grief can con-
sist in a global emotional absence of this sort (p. 193). In 
addition to employing regulative practices to control and 
adapt unpleasant emotions, we also use such practices to elicit 
emotions:
[A] state in which there is a felt absence of emotion can prompt the 
deployment of regulative mechanisms as well. The grieving person, for 
example, may act upon her environment in order for it to elicit an 
emotional effect upon her, when she has felt nothing for too long. (2019, 
p. 195)
Thus, one final way in which horror films may have a beneficial 
effect for the bereaved is in their ability to enable us to feel 
something. As Bantinaki tells us,
Fear makes us feel alive: our senses are alert; our heart is bouncing; our 
attention is highly focused. The increased arousal of horror-induced fear 
is invigorating and can be experienced as a reward, especially if one 
wants to break the emotional routine. (2012, p. 390)
Horror films are especially well placed to induce some kind of 
affective response when one’s emotions are dampened, thus 
potentially serving a regulative role for those experiencing emo-
tional numbness due to grief.
Engaging with a horror film may help to modulate and frame 
one’s experiences of grief, temporarily providing them with a 
more coherent emotional and narrative structure. Horror may 
also allow the bereaved to feel some kind of affective response 
even while in the depths of emotional numbness. The regulative 
potential of horror films may then be beneficial for those suffer-
ing the emotional upheaval of bereavement.
Conclusion
This article explored the relationship between horror films and 
grief. We suggested the thematic preoccupation of horror films 
with grief is due to more than coincidence or the general fact 
that horror is well suited for themes surrounding fears, anxie-
ties, and trauma. First, horror is especially suited to represent 
the experience of grief given genre tropes. In particular, the dis-
ruptive effects of a monster on the protagonist’s assumptive 
world within a horror story capture well the core experience of 
disruption that accompanies bereavement. Second, horror offers 
ways in which the experience of grief can be contained and 
regulated and, in doing so, may offer psychological benefits for 
the bereaved.
Throughout the article, we saw how work within the broader 
philosophical and scientific research on horror accords with our 
claims. Future research may help develop these ideas with fur-
ther direct empirical support. For instance, that horror some-
times functions as a kind of containment vessel for grief, and 
that this function may vary depending on the stage of one’s 
grief, may be further evaluated via qualitative interviews with 
the bereaved.
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Notes
 1 Taking grief to involve a process does not imply that it is a process 
with generalizable and clearly delineable stages, such as those pos-
ited by Kübler-Ross (1969): denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and 
acceptance.
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 2 See also Ratcliffe’s (2019) discussion of the ways in which grief 
involves the negotiation and comprehension of dramatic disturbances 
to one’s experiential world.
 3 Westlund (2018) argues that despite this important sense of narrative 
intractability, grief may allow for a different kind of narratability that, 
unlike paradigmatic narratives, resists narrative closure. This may be 
true of certain grief experiences. However, Westlund still holds that, 
“Contra Goldie, it is not clear that the correct account of grief will be 
best described as a narrative account” (p. 36), and we think that the 
objections to the claim that a narrative structure is a necessary compo-
nent of grief still stand.
 4 This definition contrasts with the narrower sense of “monster” which 
refers only to unnatural, supernatural, or otherwise otherworldly enti-
ties. For example, this narrower sense is implicit in Carroll’s (1990) 
popular taxonomy of monsters. Our notion encompasses the likes of 
Carroll’s “fusion,” “fission,” “magnification,” “massification,” and 
“uncanny” categories, but also includes the more pedestrian murderer 
(e.g., Norman Bates in Hitchcock’s Psycho, 1960) or deadly animal 
(e.g., the shark in Spielberg’s Jaws, 1975). As it happens, most hor-
ror films about grief do concern supernatural monsters, for reasons 
outlined next. There are exceptions to this general rule, for instance, 
Midsommer (Aster, 2019), where the monster may be construed as a 
human cult with no demonstrable supernatural power.
 5 One might think grief is frequently referenced in horror films sim-
ply because it is a strongly unpleasant and relatable experience that 
primes audiences in the appropriate way—an emotional shortcut to an 
atmosphere or mood that facilitates fear. We aim to demonstrate that 
there is a stronger connection between horror and grief than this would 
suggest, however, it is worth recognizing that our claim is compatible 
with the notion that references to grief also serve a simpler “priming” 
function. Our thanks go to an anonymous reviewer for pressing us on 
this issue.
 6 As Parkes (1988) makes clear, bereavement is not the only traumatic 
circumstance under which one’s assumptive world may be disrupted. 
Horror may also be well placed to represent other such experiences.
 7 While suppression of painful feelings may be adaptive in the acute 
stages of grief, persistent avoidance is associated with what has been 
termed “complicated grief”—a pathological form of grief that occurs 
in around 7% of the bereaved population (Baker et al., 2016).
 8 Horror films about grief that do not feature “happy endings” 
include Don’t Look Now (Roeg, 1973), The Descent (Marshall, 2005), 
and Verónica (Plaza, 2017).
 9 Other aspects of the continuing bonds framework do not seem to be 
reflected here. While continuing bonds theorists often treat contin-
ued connection with the deceased as positive and enriching for the 
bereaved (e.g., Klass et al., 1996), the continued existence of the 
Babadook does not appear to enrich Amelia’s life, even though the 
threat is contained. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for 
highlighting this issue to us.
10 Here, Lewis also draws a connection between grief and experiences 
such as “suspense.” It is beyond the scope of this article to explore 
the connections between fear and suspense, and Lewis’s varied analo-
gies may simply reflect the varied aspects of the grief process, but 
it is worth noting that many have taken there to be a close connec-
tion between these experiences. For example, some take fear to be an 
essential component of suspense (e.g., Ortony et al., 1988, p. 131).
11 Here, we cannot address in any depth the thorny question of whether 
such instances of fear are truly part of the grief process or merely 
frequent accompaniments to it. Whether it is even possible to separate 
some kind of “pure” grief process (composed of multifarious emo-
tional components) from other emotions that constitute one’s reaction 
to bereavement is unclear. The possibility of unconscious emotions 
adds further complications here, that is, it is hard to assess whether 
or not fear is always a component of grief, but it is simply not always 
phenomenologically evident.
12 That horror can facilitate physiological responses akin to those 
involved in grief may be of value both to filmmakers invested in con-
veying grief’s phenomenology and to audiences who wish to better 
understand grief. We do not believe that simply watching a film is 
likely to induce an experience of grief itself, at least insofar as grief is 
understood as a protracted emotional process (rather than a straight-
forward emotion), which generally unfolds over many weeks, months, 
or years. Evoking certain reactions typical of grief goes some way, 
however, towards communicating this complex emotional experience.
13 Here, we do not take a stance on the question of whether emotions are to 
be individuated in terms of physiological “feelings,” some kind of evalu-
ative appraisal, or through some hybrid or alternative approach. One can 
agree with Bantinaki’s claim that the overall valence of an emotion is not 
fully determined by either physiological changes or evaluative content, 
while still adopting any one of these positions with regard to the question 
of what makes a token emotion an example of a particular type.
14 Although our focus is bereavement, research suggests that viewers of 
horror films are more resilient to other kinds of events. For example, 
according to a recent study, horror fans have coped better with the 
COVID-19 pandemic (Scrivner et al., 2021). Scrivner et al. suggest 
this may be because horror allows audiences to engage with “nega-
tive” emotions like fear in a safe setting.
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